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Abstract. Th e epistemology of monotheism off ered by philosophers has given 
inadequate attention to the kind of foundational evidence to be expected of 
a personal God whose moral character is agapeic, or perfectly loving, toward all 
other agents. Th is article counters this defi ciency with the basis of a theistic epis-
temology that accommodates the distinctive moral character of a God worthy of 
worship. It captures the widely neglected agonic, or struggle-oriented, character 
of a God who seeks, by way of personal witness and intentional action, to realize 
and manifest agape among humans who suff er from selfi shness. In doing so, the 
article identifi es the overlooked role of personifying evidence of God in human 
moral character formation. In agreement with some prominent New Testament 
themes, the new perspective off ered ties the epistemology of monotheism to ro-
bust agapeic morality in a way that makes such epistemology ethically challeng-
ing for inquirers about God’s existence. Accordingly, such theistic epistemology 
will no longer be a candidate for ethically neutral, spectator refl ection.
INTRODUCTION
Notoriously, philosophers and theologians have tried to prove God’s ex-
istence by various sorts of arguments, many of which are remarkably 
elaborate. Th e list includes cosmological, teleological, ontological, mor-
al, and psychological arguments of diff erent kinds, among others. None 
of these arguments has won the day with a consensus among competent 
observers; as a result, controversy proceeds apace among philosophers 
and theologians. Th is article takes a new approach by focusing on what 
would be God’s approach to self-manifestation. Instead of focusing on 
our formulating arguments for God’s existence, we shall focus on what 
kind of evidence, or witness, God would supply in order to reveal and 
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authorize God’s personal reality, moral character, and relevant purposes 
to humans.
We shall see how God can witness to God’s reality for us, even if we 
humans cannot witness to God on our own. Th is approach accommo-
dates the compelling fact that God would need to take the initiative in 
supplying evidence of divine reality to humans. If God is inherently per-
sonal and loving toward persons, as some versions of Jewish-Christian 
monotheism suggest, we should expect direct evidence of divine real-
ity to be more akin to an authorizing personal witness than to a logical 
proof. In being non-personal, a logical proof lacks a personal character 
and personal agency and therefore lacks love toward persons. Logical 
proofs, and arguments in general, can affi  rm divine personal love, but 
they cannot directly manifest it, because they do not themselves have 
personal love in the way that personal witnesses can and sometimes do. 
Th ey are not a living personal agent in the way God is, if God exists. Di-
rect evidence of God would include direct evidence of a living personal 
agent, because only a living personal agent can directly reveal a living 
personal agent. Philosophers and theologians have neglected this impor-
tant consideration, but this article counters this neglect.
BEGINNING WITH THE TITLE “GOD” 
Discussions about God’s existence rarely pause long enough to clarify 
what kind of exalted being, particularly what kind of personal moral 
character, is under discussion. Th e result is either an unacceptably vague 
conception of God or a distorted conception of God that misrepresents 
what role the term “God” plays in traditional monotheism. According to 
a classic monotheist use, the term “God” is an honorifi c title that requires 
worthiness of worship in its title holder. In this use, the term “God” is not 
a proper name and therefore can fail to have a referent, or denotation.
Although a person can worship pretty much anything, including 
himself or herself, worthiness of worship sets a maximally high moral 
standard. It requires the moral perfection of the one worthy of worship. 
To be worthy of worship is to be worthy of full, unqualifi ed commitment. 
If, however, one is morally defi cient in any way, then one will not be wor-
thy of such exceptionless commitment. One will then be worthy at most 
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of qualifi ed commitment, given one’s moral defi ciency in some area. As 
a result, one will have to be free of moral defi ciency, that is, be morally 
perfect, to be worthy of worship. A holder of the title “God,” then, will 
be morally perfect.
Moral perfection is the rarest of valuable features in our morally trou-
bled world. No mere human emerges as a viable candidate for moral 
perfection, and this seems to be one of the few truths about the world 
that refl ective humans can agree on. Even if some humans set moral per-
fection as their life goal, and work hard to achieve it, no mere human can 
plausibly claim to have reached that goal in this earthly life. In seeking 
what is morally best for humans, however, God would seek moral per-
fection for them. If God sought something less than moral perfection for 
humans, this would invite the charge of God’s being morally lax, in virtue 
of settling for something that falls short of what is morally ideal for hu-
mans. Such moral laxness would call into question God’s being perfectly 
loving toward humans and therefore God’s being worthy of worship.
Exactly how God would seek moral perfection for humans is hard, 
if not impossible, for cognitively limited humans to specify a priori, in 
the abstract. We may have to “look and see” in actual human experience 
and history to acquire the needed information. Human experience and 
history may surprise us on this matter. We can plausibly infer that mere 
humans fail and will fail to acquire moral perfection on their own, but 
God would have various alternatives to counter this widespread failure. 
We do well to look at human experience and history to see how, if at all, 
God seeks to counter human moral failure for the sake of eventual hu-
man moral perfection. Th erefore, we should not automatically expect 
human inquiry about God to proceed solely a priori, just on the basis of 
reason and defi nition. Th e relevance of human experience and history 
merits careful attention here. Th e key question now is this: what kind of 
experience would be relevant to God in a manner that suitably indicates 
God’s existence or presence or even God’s absence?
In seeking what is morally best for humans, God would seek to com-
municate somehow with humans. Th e desired divine communication 
would aim to be morally challenging, and thus redemptive, in virtue of 
bringing humans not only information about God but also acquaintance 
with God’s moral character. Th e latter acquaintance would enhance hu-
man motivation toward conformity with God’s moral character, and 
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would prevent relevant ideas about God from being purely speculative. 
John Baillie explains:
What is directly revealed to us . . . is not truths or doctrines about God but 
God himself. Our doctrines about God are always secondary to our direct 
fi nding of God in the realities of our experience, and are never wholly ad-
equate to that fi nding or wholly exhaustive of its meaning. God does not 
[just] communicate with us: He does something far better—He communes 
with us. Not the communication of propositions but the communion of 
spirits is the last word about divine revelation (1929, pp. 114-15; cf. Baillie 
1962, pp. 15-18).
Such communion would be de re, and not merely de dicto, in virtue of 
being directly agent-to-agent (or person-to person), and not just agent-
to-proposition. It would involve the direct acquaintance of one personal 
agent with another, even if human beliefs accompany the acquaintance. 
Accordingly, God’s witness of divine reality to humans need not be al-
together propositional; it can include a non-verbal, non-propositional 
component.
If God’s inherent moral character is one of unselfi sh love, or agape, 
toward others and is the personal power yielding such love among hu-
mans, then the salient basis is set for human acquaintance and commu-
nion with God. Accordingly, Baillie remarks: “Th e Christian’s fi nding of 
God in Christ is but the fulfi llment of faith’s older fi nding of Him in all 
love and goodness, wherever these are revealed to our human eyes. God 
is love. Where love is, there God is” (1929, p. 119). Th is approach gives 
us a defi nite, realizable standard for human experience of God’s moral 
character rather than of some alternative, such as a harmful counterfeit. 
Humans experience God’s moral character whenever they experience 
agape, even if humans play a cooperative role, at least de re, in the provi-
sion of agape in many cases. Indeed, if we fail to fi nd evidence of God’s 
moral character in agape, we may fail to fi nd it anywhere.
We fi nd a clear connection between God and agape suggested in vari-
ous parts of the New Testament. For instance, according to 1 John 4:7-
8,16: “ . . . love is of God, and he who loves is born of God and knows 
God. He who does not love does not know God; for God is love . . . . 
God is love, and he who abides in love abides in God, and God abides in 
him” (RSV). Th e two striking claims that “God is love” and that “love is 
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of God” suggest a key role for agape in human acquaintance with God. 
Th e heart of agape is one’s unselfi shly willing what is good for some-
one, and such willing involves a distinctive kind of power: the power to 
love others unselfi shly. If “love is of God,” this power is not just a human 
product, even if humans play a direct incomplete role in some instances 
of its production. In that case, agape arises instead, at least in part, from 
the power of God, whose moral character is inherently and perfectly lov-
ing. Th e suggestion, then, is that if one wants to see what God is like in 
action, one should look to agape in action, even if humans are directly 
involved in some cases.
As suggested, a morally perfect God would seek what is morally best 
for humans, even what is morally perfect for them. Th is eff ort would in-
clude a divine redemptive call to humans to be conformed to God’s mor-
al character in willing cooperation with God’s revealed purposes. Th e di-
vine call would not be coercive, so long as God allows for human agency 
in response to God, and it could come in various ways. It could come 
through humans who relay the call, or it could come from God without 
human intermediaries. It also could come through circumstances that 
involve humans, such as failed human relationships, even when human 
intermediaries do not fi gure directly in the call itself. Accordingly, God 
would have various ways to extend a redemptive call to humans, and we 
cognitively limited humans should not consider ourselves to be in a po-
sition to comprehend fully all of the ways God can extend such a call. 
Even so, God would seek to call at least receptive humans to conformity 
with God’s moral character, for their own good. Th is would exonerate 
God from a charge of moral laxness in relating to humans.
THEISM AS AGAPEIC AND AGONIC
Like divine redemption in general, God’s redemptive call would be ago-
nic in its intended eff ects, owing to a struggle to realize and manifest 
divine agape among all persons. In other words, it would be a call to 
struggle against whatever is anti-God (that is, whatever opposes God’s 
moral character) and for whatever honors God. If divine agape is agonic 
in this manner, we should expect God and direct evidence of God to be 
likewise agonic. In particular, we should expect such evidence to aim to 
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have its recipients become similarly agonic in a struggle to realize and 
manifest divine agape among all persons. Th is would put evidence of 
God in a profoundly new light.
Th e apostle Paul characterizes God and divine redemption as agonic 
in a number of his letters. For instance, aft er referring to God as “the 
one who calls you” (Galatians 5:8; cf. 1:6), Paul remarks that “the de-
sires of the [human] fl esh are against the Spirit [of God], and the desires 
of the Spirit are against the fl esh; for these are opposed to each other” 
(Galatians 5:17, RSV; cf. Romans 7:22-25). He then identifi es “works of 
the fl esh,” not with deeds of the body, but instead with immoral actions 
and attitudes in confl ict with God’s moral character: idolatry, jealousy, 
drunkenness, lewdness, fornication, and so on (Galatians 5:19-21).
In contrast, the traits of “the Spirit” are the distinctive features of God’s 
worship-worthy moral character: “love (agape), joy, peace, patience, kind-
ness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness, self-control” (Galatians 5:22-23, 
RSV). In Paul’s portrait, God’s redemptive call is a call to struggle against 
the immoral “works of the fl esh” and for (our manifesting) the features of 
God’s moral character. Indeed, Paul thinks of God’s Spirit as off ering to 
humans not only a personal witness to God as Father (Romans 8:15-16; 
cf. 2 Corinthians 2:22, 5:5), but also the divine power to “put to death” 
their immoral deeds antithetical to God’s moral character (see Romans 
8:13). Accordingly, God not only calls humans to struggle but also off ers 
the power humans need to undertake the struggle. Paul likens his own 
redemptive struggle with the churches of Galatia to childbirth: “. . . I am 
again in the pain of childbirth until Christ is formed in you” (Galatians 
4:19, NRSV). Th e struggle, according to Paul, is for humans willingly 
“to be conformed to the image of [God’s] Son” (Romans 8:29). We shall 
clarify how this struggle proceeds, in order to identify the distinctive 
kind of direct evidence we should expect of an agonic God.
Instead of a mere principle-oriented approach, Paul takes a personify-
ing approach to the redemptive struggle by (a) identifying the person of 
Jesus, and not just moral principles, as the self-giving manifestation of 
God (see Philippians 2:4-11; cf. Colossians 1:15), and (b) endorsing the 
standard of a human person’s “becoming like him [=Jesus]” in certain 
ways (see Philippians 3:10; cf. Romans 13:14). In accordance with the 
personifying standard that Jesus “emptied himself ” for the sake of God 
(Philippians 2:7), Paul portrays his own redemptive struggle as follows:
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Whatever gain I had, I counted as loss for the sake of Christ. Indeed I count 
everything as loss because of the surpassing worth of knowing Christ Jesus 
my Lord. For his sake I have suff ered the loss of all things, and count them 
as refuse, in order that I may gain Christ and be found in him, not having 
a righteousness of my own, based on law, but that which is through faith in 
Christ, the righteousness from God that depends on faith; [in order] that 
I may know him and the power of his resurrection, and may share his suff er-
ings, becoming like him in his death, that if possible I may attain the resur-
rection from the dead. Not that I have already obtained this or am already 
perfect; but I press on to make it my own . . . (Philippians 3:7-12, RSV). 
Paul’s redemptive struggle is both negative and positive: it is against all 
things that challenge God’s supremacy, and it is for knowing God and his 
resurrection power, as exemplifi ed in the resurrection of the crucifi ed 
Jesus. Ultimately, then, the redemptive struggle is a struggle for humans 
to participate in God’s life-giving resurrection power anchored in self-
giving divine agape. (On the role of “mutuality” between Jesus and his 
followers in this connection, see Longenecker 2003.)
Paul thinks of God as off ering morally powerful righteousness to hu-
mans (including a right relationship with God) as a perfectly free gift  of 
divine “grace,” without human merit or earning (see Romans 3:21-25, 
4:4-5). Even so, the human reception of this powerful free gift , through 
human faith (or trust) in God, is centrally agonic, replete with human 
struggle, including the struggle to put God fi rst over all other things. 
Th e latter point is widely neglected among interpreters of Jesus and Paul, 
and this hinders a needed understanding of faith, or trust, in God as 
crucially involving human struggle, beyond human thinking, believing, 
and reasoning. 
Paul’s agonic approach to divine redemption of humans is suggested 
by the following remark: “[God] has graciously granted you the privilege 
not only of believing in Christ, but of suff ering for him as well – since 
you are having the same struggle (agōn) that you saw I had… (Philip-
pians 1:29-30, NRSV). Th e redemptive struggle of suff ering emerges also 
in the Pauline letter to the Colossians: “I rejoice in my suff erings for your 
sake, and . . . I complete what is lacking in Christ’s affl  ictions for the sake 
of his body, that is, the church” (1:24, RSV; cf. 2:1). Even if Paul is not 
directly responsible for the letter to the Colossians (and the jury is still 
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out on this), an astute student of his teaching is, as suggested by its clear 
parallels with Paul’s remarks in 2 Corinthians 1:5, 4:8-11. 
Paul’s acknowledgment of the key role of human struggle in receiving 
and sharing the power of divine redemption fi ts well with his otherwise 
puzzling injunction: “. . . work out your own salvation with fear and trem-
bling; for God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good 
pleasure” (Philippians 2:12-13, RSV; cf. Romans 13:12, 2 Corinthians 6:7, 
10:4). Paul’s injunction is defi nitely not the following: work to earn, or 
to merit, your salvation from God. Instead, his key idea is that people 
are called to struggle, even in suff ering, to receive and thereby to share 
the power of divine redemption freely on off er. We may understand the 
following remark attributed to Jesus in the same vein: “Struggle to enter 
through the narrow door [to God’s kingdom]; for many, I tell you, will 
try to enter and will not be able” (Luke 13:24; cf. Matthew 7:13-14). Th e 
struggle in question enhances the cooperative receptivity of those who 
seek to appropriate God’s powerful free gift  of a life of agape in accor-
dance with God’s moral character.
Let’s use the word “temptation” for whatever invites one to be anti-
God in some way, in virtue of opposing God’s moral character, whether 
in attitude or in action. Ethelbert Stauff er observes:
[Human] thinking that treads the road [of] faith [in God] has to fi ght a daily 
battle with temptation . . . . [A]gain and again the way is beset with puzzles 
and darkness…. [I]n temptation, [however], theology passes into prayer, 
that asks God himself for the answer to the enigma of our historical experi-
ences (cf. Psalm 73:2, 15ff ., 28). Only thought that prays can lead beyond the 
temptation and take us from one certainty to another” [cf. Job 27:1, 42:8] 
(1955, p. 175).
Stauff er adds an important component to an account that off ers a per-
sonifying agonic approach to the divine redemption of humans. We may 
call this component “kenotic prayer.”
Th e adjective “kenotic” stems from the Greek verb (kenoō) that un-
derlies the idea, in Philippians 2:7, of Jesus emptying himself of his own 
preferences in humble obedience to his divine Father, even to the ex-
tent of death on the cross for others. (On this important idea, see Gor-
man 2001, pp. 253-59, 2009, pp. 9-39.) We may think of the redemp-
tive struggle, including its accompanying suff ering, as being intended by 
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God to prompt humans to engage in kenotic prayer to God, beyond mere 
thinking, believing, and reasoning. A perfectly loving God would want 
people to call on God, in kenotic prayer, for purposes of human redemp-
tion via cooperative fellowship with God. Such prayer would enhance 
one’s receptivity to the new life off ered by God, in virtue of one’s empty-
ing oneself of ambitions contrary to God’s purposes. (For some relevant 
philosophical discussion, see Stump 1979.)
A salient example of kenotic prayer is found in Jesus in Gethsemane, 
just before his arrest and crucifi xion. For good reason, the situation is 
traditionally called Jesus’s “agony in the Garden,” in the light of his pain-
ful struggle in the face of a torturous death. Some ancient versions of 
Luke’s Gospel report that “his sweat became like great drops of blood 
falling down on the ground” (Luke 22:44, NRSV). His agonizing prayer 
is represented in Mark’s Gospel as follows: “Abba, Father, for you all 
things are possible; remove this cup from me; yet, not what I want, but 
what you want” (Mark 14:36, NRSV; cf. Matthew 26:39, Luke 22:42). Th is 
prayer is agonic and kenotic: agonic, because Jesus struggles against his 
initial preference and for submission to God’s will; and kenotic, because 
Jesus empties, or denies, his initial preference in order to obey God’s call 
to self-giving obedience for the sake of others (cf. 2 Corinthians 8:9). Ac-
cordingly, we can think of the agonic and kenotic features of redemption 
as serving God’s purpose to enhance human obedience toward God. Th is 
obedience contributes to the realizing and manifesting of divine agape 
among humans, and thereby to the human personifying of God’s moral 
character.
A central theme of Paul’s redemptive message is that “God was in 
Christ reconciling the world to himself ” (2 Corinthians 5:19, RSV). Ac-
cordingly, we may think of God himself as struggling, even suff ering, in 
redemption in order to identify with humans in need of divine redemp-
tion. (For discussion of divine suff ering, see Moltmann 1981, chapter 2, 
Fretheim 1984, Fiddes 1988, and Wolterstorff  1988.) In this perspective, 
God is engaged in a struggle to undermine evil for the benefi t of humans, 
without destroying human agency or protecting humans from all evil. 
God is, in short, agonic because agapeic.
Jesus thought of his controversial ministry as guided by a divine 
struggle against evil. For instance, he remarks that “. . . if it is by the fi nger 
of God that I cast out the demons, then the kingdom of God has come 
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to you” (Luke 11:20, NRSV; cf. Matthew 12:28, Mark 3:27). Accordingly, 
Jesus attributes the power behind his agape-based agonic ministry to 
God. In the language of John’s Gospel, “. . . the Son can do nothing on his 
own, but only what he sees the Father doing” (John 5:19, NRSV; cf. John 
8:28). In this portrait, the Jewish-Christian God is agonic for the sake of 
human redemption aimed at the realization of divine agape among all 
persons. Th is divine struggle intends to be life-giving to all humans, who 
cannot supply the needed agapeic life on their own. We need to consider 
the relevant kind of agape more closely.
PERSONIFYING AGAPEIC EVIDENCE
We have characterized agape broadly as one’s unselfi shly willing what 
is good for someone, and we have identifi ed agape as being at the heart 
of God’s worship-worthy character. Divine love, however, is peculiar in 
its scope: it extends not only to friends of God, but also to resolute en-
emies of God. Such unselfi sh love is arguably a requirement of a morally 
perfect, worship-worthy character. Jesus acknowledges divine enemy-
love and a corresponding requirement of human enemy-love, as follows: 
“Love your enemies and pray for those who persecute you, so that you 
may be children of your Father in heaven; for he makes his sun rise on 
the evil and on the good” (Matthew 5:44-45, NRSV). A parallel remark 
attributed to Jesus in Luke’s Gospel is that “[God] is kind to the ungrate-
ful and the wicked. Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful” (Luke 
6:35-36, NRSV). Such enemy love, including praying for one’s enemies, 
is rarely endorsed by humans, even in the arena of longstanding reli-
gions. (For a possible move in this rare direction, see Proverbs 25:21-22; 
cf. Romans 12:20-21. For discussion, see Furnish 1972, chapter 1, Klas-
sen 1984, chapter 4, Outka 1992, and Topel 2001, chapter 5.)
Paul straightforwardly acknowledges divine enemy-love as follows: 
“God proves his love (agape) for us in that while we were still sinners 
Christ died for us. . . . [W]hile we were enemies, we were reconciled to 
God through the death of his Son . . .” (Romans 5:8,10, NRSV). It fol-
lows from Paul’s remarks that God proves his redemptive love even for 
his enemies. Paul regards himself as a former enemy of God who was 
unworthily shown God’s redemptive love, or grace (see Galatians 1:13, 15; 
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cf. 1 Corinthians 15:8-10). Such divine love prompts the following kenotic 
response from Paul: “I will boast all the more gladly of my weaknesses, 
so that the power of Christ may dwell in me. Th erefore I am content with 
weaknesses, insults, hardships, persecutions, and calamities for the sake 
of Christ; for whenever I am weak, then I am strong” (2 Corinthians 12:9-
10, NRSV). God’s unique power of agape, even toward enemies, is shown 
to be unique and enduring against the backdrop of human weaknesses of 
various sorts, particularly moral weaknesses. Accordingly, Paul values di-
vine power over human power as the needed basis of human faith in God 
(see 1 Corinthians 2:3-5; cf. 2 Corinthians 4:7-11, 1 Th essalonians 1:5).
Enemy love fi gures centrally in God’s witness to God’s reality, because 
it is salient evidence of God’s unique moral character and abiding power. 
Th is evidence goes beyond propositions, arguments, and even experienc-
es to distinctive personifying evidence. Th at is, it can reside in the moral 
character of a person in virtue of this character’s being formed by divine 
power to refl ect God’s moral character of agape, even toward enemies. 
Th is consideration gives defi nite meaning to the present talk of personify-
ing evidence in contrast with propositions, arguments, and experiences.
Th e relevant idea of personifying evidence is suggested in John’s Gos-
pel by the notion of a person’s being “born of the Spirit” of God (John 
3:6), and in Paul’s letters by the assumption that “if anyone is in Christ, 
there is a new creation” (2 Corinthians 5:17, NRSV; cf. Galatians 6:15). 
Paul contrasts this new creation with “our old self . . . enslaved to sin” 
(Romans 6:6, NRSV), thus suggesting that it includes a new self, a new 
“inmost self ” that will “delight in the law of God” (Romans 7:22, NRSV; 
cf. Romans 8:4). He thinks of this new creation as one’s being spiritu-
ally (but not yet bodily) raised, or resurrected, to “walk in newness of 
life” (Romans 6:4, RSV; cf. Colossians 2:12). Accordingly, he speaks of 
the Roman Christians as “those who have been brought from death to 
life” (Romans 6:13, NRSV). Th e new self in question corresponds to the 
divine promise of Ezekiel 36:26 to God’s people: “A new heart I will give 
you, and a new spirit I will put within you . . .” (NRSV; cf. 11:19, Jeremiah 
31:33). Th e promise off ers the divine gift  of a new human center of mo-
tivation, a center that agrees with God’s moral character of agape toward 
all others. (For relevant discussion, see Hubbard 2002.)
Paul thinks of the new self as the willing recipient of God’s agape 
given through God’s Spirit: “God’s love has been poured into our hearts 
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through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us” (Romans 5:5, NRSV). 
In addition, he thinks of divine agape in humans as the primary “fruit 
of the Spirit” of God, involving one’s being “led by the Spirit” of God 
(Galatians 5:18,22; cf. Romans 8:1-5). Even more to the point, he regards 
divine agape as a ground for hope in God that precludes our being disap-
pointed by such hope (Romans 5:5). We plausibly can treat this as a cog-
nitive ground for human hope in God, and not just as a causal ground. 
Th at is, divine agape as an experienced transformative gift  is salient evi-
dence of God’s presence in one’s life, although this important consider-
ation is overlooked by most philosophers and theologians. When such 
evidence is delivered directly by God’s personal Spirit as representative 
of God’s moral character, it takes the form of an authorizing personal 
witness to God’s reality rather than a logical proof (see Romans 8:15-16, 
2 Corinthians 2:22, 5:5; cf. Moser 2008, chapter 2).
According to John’s Gospel, divine love in one’s moral character is 
an indicator of one’s being a genuine child of God and disciple of Jesus, 
who remarks as follows to his followers: “Just as I have loved you, you 
also should love one another. By this everyone will know that you are my 
disciples, if you have love (agape) for one another” (John 13:34-35; cf. 
1 John 3:1,14,18-19). Th e agapeic evidence identifi ed by John and Paul 
rests on the personally experienced power of personal divine agape and 
thus is person-oriented throughout. Th ese considerations fi t well with 
the following observation by F.X. Durrwell: “. . . redemption as a whole is 
a personal work. It is so in Christ who, in his death and resurrection, is 
himself salvation; it is so in the church which shares in salvation through 
fellowship with Christ in his death and resurrection” (1972, pp. 167-68). 
Th e salient evidence in such fellowship is more akin to an authorizing 
personal witness from God than to a logical proof or any other kind of 
argument.
In the wake of Jesus (Matthew 5:38-48, Luke 6:27-36), both John and 
Paul think of divine agape as extending to recipients beyond the follow-
ers of Jesus, to the whole world of persons, including enemies of God 
(cf. John 3:16, Romans 5:6-10, 12:14-21). We may distinguish, however, 
between God’s intended human recipients of such love and the willingly 
transformed human bearers of divine love. God’s intended human re-
cipients can include self-avowed enemies of God, whereas the willingly 
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transformed human bearers are no longer enemies of God, because they 
have yielded, if imperfectly, to God’s call to redemption.
Willing human bearers of divine agape manifest personifying evidence 
of God’s reality, because they are personal witnesses to the transforming 
power of divine agape among humans (including themselves) and thus 
to the reality of God’s moral character. Such personal witnesses, accord-
ing to Paul, “are being changed into [God’s] likeness from one degree of 
glory to another” (2 Corinthians 3:18, RSV). As a result, Paul refers to the 
Corinthian Christians themselves as “a letter from Christ . . . written . . . 
with the Spirit of the living God . . . on tablets of human hearts” (2 Corin-
thians 3:3, RSV). Such personifying evidence goes beyond any argument 
or logical proof in its power of personal communion, person-to-person. 
Being personal, it conveys God’s personal moral character to a person in 
a way that no argument or logical proof (being nonpersonal) can. Even 
so, one can use an abductive, explanatory argument to challenge skeptics 
about divine reality, on the basis of the best available explanation of the 
human transformation in question (see Moser 2008, pp. 126-43, 2010, 
chapter 4; cf. Wiebe 2004, chapter 3). Such an argument, however, must 
not be confused with the basic experiential evidence for God’s existence 
supplied by transformative agape. ( For an account of basic, foundational 
evidence that avoids a confusion of such evidence with an argument but 
accommodates the important role of abduction, see Moser 1989.)
Th e divine witness in agape is a witness in action, in personifi ed re-
demptive action, as Paul stresses in his understanding of the cross (see 
Romans 5:8; cf. 3:24-26). God could present merely claims and argu-
ments to humans, but such an intellectualist strategy would omit some-
thing that is morally, motivationally, and personally important: person-
to-person communion on the basis of God’s moral character of agape 
even toward enemies. As a result, a perfectly loving God would not settle 
just for claims and arguments by way of revelation. God would promote 
the kind of personal witness to God’s reality that resides in personify-
ing evidence refl ective of God’s moral character. God would draw near 
to humans in a personal manner that goes beyond any claims, logical 
proofs, or arguments in general. Th e result, as suggested, would be an 
authorizing divine witness, from a cognitive authority, to divine reality 
for humans.
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In the epistemologies of Paul and John, Jesus Christ is the paradigm 
of personifying evidence of God, given that he is “the likeness of God” 
(2 Corinthians 4:4, RSV; cf. Colossians 1:15) and the one, “in the bosom 
of the Father, [who] has made [God] known” (John 1:18, RSV). Accord-
ingly, John’s Gospel portrays Jesus as saying: “Whoever has seen me has 
seen the Father. How can you say, ‘Show us the Father’?” (John 14:9, 
NRSV), and Paul speaks of “the knowledge of the glory of God in the 
face of Christ” (2 Corinthians 4:6, NRSV). Jesus himself emerges there-
fore as personifying evidence of God, in virtue of being an authoritative 
and authorizing personal witness to God.
We should clarify what exactly God, as worthy of worship, would seek 
to reveal to humans. If the answer is, as suggested, “God’s personal moral 
character,” we can see why God would rely on an irreducibly personal 
witness for self-revelation, rather than on mere information or mere ar-
guments. Th e best witness to a personal moral character is itself per-
sonal and hence goes beyond mere information and mere arguments. 
Th is simple but crucial lesson is widely neglected among philosophers, 
theologians, and other theorists. In bringing it to center stage, we can 
begin to make sense of the kind of direct, foundational evidence and 
self-manifestation to be expected of a God worthy of worship. We also 
can see why an authorizing self-witness from God is better suited as di-
rect evidence in this case than a mere logical proof or any other kind of 
mere argument. (For the bearing of this lesson on the traditional theistic 
arguments, in connection with divine hiding, see Moser 2010, chapter 3; 
cf. Richardson 1966, chapter 6.)
Personifi ed evidence from God’s witness has distinctive features that 
cannot be fully captured by claims and arguments. In particular, claims 
and arguments cannot exhaust divine agape directly shown, or manifest-
ed, to a person by a personal witness who personifi es agape. Accordingly, 
Paul speaks of “the manifestation of the truth” regarding divine redemp-
tion, where this manifestation includes the following: “commending 
ourselves to the conscience of every person before God” (2 Corinthians 
4:2, italics added). His approach concerns person-based manifestation of 
evidence regarding God’s redemptive intervention in Jesus. Th is mani-
festation is twofold according to Paul: “[We are] always carrying in the 
body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested 
in our bodies. For while we live we are always being given up to death 
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for Jesus’s sake, so that the life of Jesus may be manifested in our mortal 
fl esh” (2 Corinthians 4:10-11, RSV; cf. 6:9). Th is sums up the existential 
core of “dying and rising with Christ.”
Th e “life of Jesus” includes the resurrection power that Paul sought 
to know (see 2 Corinthians 4:14, Philippians 3:10; cf. Furnish 1984, 
pp. 283-84, Savage, 1996, pp. 177-78, and Byrnes 2003, pp. 61-71). Th is 
power is the same divine power of self-giving love that motivated Jesus 
to obey God even to the extreme of accepting death on a criminal’s cross. 
As a result, Paul can say to the churches of Galatia that in his ministry 
“Jesus Christ was publicly portrayed as crucifi ed” before their eyes (Ga-
latians 3:1, RSV). A witness who manifests the death of Jesus also mani-
fests the resurrection life of Jesus, if only in enduring suff ering without 
relinquishing agape for others. More specifi cally, one’s dying-and-rising 
with Jesus is the way to appropriate and to manifest divine agonic agape. 
It yields evidence, in a personal witness, of divine reality and presence, 
and it is the existential reality to which Christian faith and hope in God 
commit a person (cf. Byrnes 2003, pp. 121-22, 283-85).
CONCLUDING IMPEDIMENTS
We now can identify three human impediments to acknowledging and 
appropriating God’s personal witness. Th e fi rst impediment involves ne-
glecting the fact that the personifying divine evidence in question has 
a diachronic character in human witnesses that involves development 
over time. Philosophers and theologians rarely look for evidence of God 
with such a diachronic character, and assume instead that evidence of 
God would be synchronic, available at a moment. In contrast, we may 
regard the aforementioned developmental feature in willing humans as 
spiritual maturation that includes one’s becoming increasingly true to 
God, in communion with God.
A person’s believing truths about God falls short of a person’s becom-
ing true to God in virtue of being conformed to God’s moral character, in 
a struggle of dying and rising with Jesus. Th e latter conformation yields 
personifying evidence of God in a person over time. Human witnesses 
to God, then, owe their witnessing power (to God) to their becoming 
true to God over time and therefore, ultimately, to God’s power. Th is is 
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no surprise, given that the basic empowering moral character for divine 
agape is God’s character. Human witnesses to God are but cooperative 
benefi ciaries of this divine power and evidence.
Th e second impediment is perhaps the most common: it is human 
unwillingness to undertake an agonic life toward agape-oriented charac-
ter formation. Kierkegaard remarks bluntly: “you must die to your self-
ishness, . . . because it is only through your selfi shness that the world has 
power over you . . . But naturally there is nothing a human being hangs on 
to so fi rmly—indeed with his whole self!—as to his selfi shness!” (1851, 
p. 77). Human selfi shness is, of course, antithetical to agape and there-
fore to a personifi ed witness to the reality of divine agape. A refusal to die 
to selfi shness is, in eff ect, a refusal to live an agape-oriented life and thus 
to witness personally to the reality of the divine source of agape.
Kierkegaard seriously distorts the truth at hand with this claim: “be-
fore the Spirit who gives life can come, you must fi rst die to [selfi sh-
ness]” (1851, p. 79; cf. p. 81). As suggested previously, the power of God’s 
Spirit is off ered to humans to “put to death” selfi shness and other human 
traits contrary to God’s moral character (see Romans 8:13). Accordingly, 
we might say that even human repentance is an empowered gift  off ered 
by God. A perfectly loving God, in other words, would off er to willing 
humans the power to “die to” selfi shness as the way to realize coopera-
tive life with God in agape toward others. Humans therefore would not 
be left , as Kierkegaard suggests, with their own meager power to purify 
themselves of selfi shness before God’s Spirit could supply God’s life-giv-
ing power. Instead, God’s life-giving power would be available to humans 
to set aside habitual selfi shness for the sake of cooperative life with God. 
Kierkegaard mistakenly off ers human self-purifi cation as a precondition 
for, rather than a benefi ciary of, the arrival of God’s life-giving power. 
Th is is a recipe for frustration and excess severity, given human weak-
ness. (For further discussion of Kierkegaard on God and agape, see Mo-
ser and McCreary 2010; cf. Walsh 2009, chapter 6.)
A third impediment is a close cousin to selfi shness: human self-
righteousness, the attitude that one is morally self-adequate, even before 
God. Th is is a kind of moral pride that readily takes the credit for the 
agape manifested in one’s life, thereby omitting a crucial role for God in 
this connection. It endorses human moral self-achievement over either 
the need or the availability of the gift  of divine grace. Accordingly, such 
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pride obscures the need for kenosis in a human life relative to God, and 
therefore clouds the personal witness of God to God’s character of agonic 
agape toward humans. In particular, it resists the humble but struggling 
human reception of this witness in one’s own moral character. Such re-
ception is cast off  for the sake of prideful human achievement in the 
moral domain. Th e agonic witness of divine grace, then, is at odds with 
human self-righteousness, morally and cognitively. (For relevant discus-
sion, see Niebuhr 1964, chapters 4-5.)
In conclusion, we have identifi ed agapeic theism as off ering a widely 
neglected but distinctive approach to direct evidence of divine reality. 
Such theism characterizes this evidence as existentially signifi cant, in 
virtue of its call for agonic human participation in, and thus personifi ed 
witnessing to, the divine life of agape toward others. We now can see why 
and how the direct evidence of an agapeic and agonic God is morally 
signifi cant in a manner worthy of more attention among philosophers 
and theologians. Religious epistemology, accordingly, can come to life in 
agapeic theism as agonic. It thus can move beyond mere refl ection and 
discussion to the key role of human struggle for agape toward others. 
A worship-worthy God would foster such action-directed epistemology, 
for the vital good of all concerned.
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